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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
NOllUlVIICHI KAZURA, - - - CalsleOINlo. 
FRANK E. ROBERTS, HAR-
OLD F. ROBERTS, BE TH ) 
PURDUE, ROBERTA BERRY 
and CAROL BUNNELL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to condemn, for the construction 
of the Salt Lake County Civic Auditorium, a parcel 
1Jf ground occupied by what was known as the Colonial 
Hotel, owned by defendants. The taking included the 
entire parcel upon which the Hotel was located. The 
1 
County obtained occupancy of the Hotel property in 
May of 1966; has demolished the Hotel building; anu is 
constructing the Auditorium on the site. Appellant is 
the plaintiff, Salt Lake County, herein ref erred to as 
"plaintiff." Respondents are referred to as "defendants." 
DISPOSITION IN LO\V.ER COURT 
The case came on for trial before the Honorable 
Leonard W. Elton and a specially impaneled jury to 
hear this case on the 15th day of May, 1967; after 4 
days of trial the Court declared a mistrial and the case 
was re-set for trial before Judge Elton. 
During the first trial the Court made numerous 
rulings on contested legal issues of which the parties 
were aware at the second trial. One such ruling was 
that evidence of the appraisal value for tax purposes 
was inadmissible. This occurred after one of the owners, 
Harold Roberts, testified, without being asked, that the 
County had appraised the property at $130,000.00 for 
tax purposes. The County protested vigorously and 
asked that the Court instruct the jury to ignore that 
comment. The Court overruled plaintiff's objection and 
refused to so instruct the jury. On cross-examination 
counsel for the County asked what the assessment was 
and then asked the witness if he was familiar with the 
statutes requiring that said assessment be at a specified 
percentage of actual market value. On defendant's ob-
jection at that point, the Court reconsidered the whole 
matter, heard arguments of counsel with respect to it, 
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and studied the matter overnight. On the following 
morniug he iustructecl the jury to disregard the wit-
ness' comment about the valuation for tax purposes, and 
the cross-examination that related to it. Plaintiff con-
teuds that that incident contributed substantially to the 
Court's later decision to declare a mistrial. 
Another such ruling was that a purported off er of 
the L.D.S. Church to buy the Robert's property was 
inadmissible because of its uncertainty. Defendants, 
after opportunity to do so, could not establish that an 
offer had been made by the L.D.S. Church or anyone, 
nor could they establish, since the conversation which 
they attempted to construe as an offer involved a trade 
of property, what the amount of the off er was. 
The case was eventually retried before Judge El-
ton and another specially impaneled jury and a verdict 
was reached. Plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial 
which the Court refused and this appeal was instituted. 
In the course of the appeal proceeding, it was dis-
covered that a substantial part of the cross-examination 
of plaintiff's chief appraisal witness was missing from 
the record. Inquiry indicated the Court Reporter could 
not locate his notes of the missing testimony. Counsel 
for both parties met with Judge Elton to consider how 
the record should be completed. On defendant's motion, 
the Court instructed counsel for both parties to make a 
statement of their recollection of the missing evidence 
and proceedings. Plaintiff thereafter filed a statement 
of proceedings and defendants filed objections thereto, 
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together with a supplemental statement. Plaintiff ob. 
jected to defendant's statement and filed in support of 
said objection, an affidavit of the witness whose testi-
mony was in question. On defendant's motion the Court 
ordered that the witness' affidavit be stricken, com-
menting that the question whether it should be so 
stricken, could be considered on appeal. The Court then 
authorized plaintiff to make a further responsive state· 
ment of proceedings in support of its objection to 
defendant's statement. Judge Elton then observed that 
he had no independent recollections of the missing testi-
mony and only very brief notes concerning it and indi-
cated that he would, by way of settlement and apprornl 
of the record as required by Rule 75 (m), merely trans· 
mit the statements of counsel for both parties without 
adding to them. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a new trial and a decision of the 
Supreme Court defining the limitations of expert testi-
mony on value based on income. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
As condemnation cases go, this one should have 
been easy; the taking was of the entire parcel, hence, 
there was no severance damage; the parties agreed that 
the highest and best use was a continuation of the 
existing use and they further agreed that the value of 
the property taken depended primarily upon the income 
4 
il would produce. Then: remained only the questions - -
how much income the property would produce and based 
on that income, what was its value as of April 14, 1966. 
The property was a 3rd or 4th class hotel ( R-354 
Jiue 18 and 668 line 28), located at 144 'Vest 1st South 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. It was built between 
1880 and the turn of the Century (R-250 line 16, 353 
line 22 and 667 line 30) ; a five story brick building on 
a sandstone foundation, that almost entirely covered the 
parcel of land on which it was built. 
It had been leased by the Roberts family since 
1943 ( R- 231 line 6). The lease was a gross lease of 
the entire property and provided that the owner should 
pay the taxes and do the maintenance work on the 
structure itself. The owner also incurred expense for 
insurance ( R-389-392 also 612-614). The lessee, from 
1943 to 1957, was Fujio Iwasaki who operated the Hotel 
and a restaurant in the basement ( R-231 line 6). In 
Hl57, lwasaki's lease was assigned to Harry Takenaka 
(R-2.J.7-248) ·who operated the Hotel until it was taken 
by Salt Lake County. The assignment of Iwasaki to 
Takenaka was without consideration, but Takenaka paid 
Iwasaki for the personal property ( R-254 line 10). The 
gross rent charged to Iwasaki was $500 per month in 
Hl42 or 1943, and was increased to $650 per month in 
1953 (R-246-247). The rent was renegotiated shortly 
after Takenaka took over and was again fixed at $650 
per month (R-404-405). In 1961 Frank E. Roberts 
sold the property to his children. Shortly thereafter, 
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the children raised the rent iu midterm to $700 
per month (R-405-406 and 611). Harold Roberts testi-
fied that they attempted to raise it higher on several 
occasions, but were unable to get the operator to agree 
(R-405 line 25). The rent was again renegotiated at 
the end of the lease term in 1963 by the Roberts children 
and again fixed at $700 per month ( R-406 line 3), the 
amount in effect when the property was taken by the 
County. During the last five years of the operation of 
the Hotel, the Takenakas earned from the total opera-
tion thereof, between $4,274 and $8,491 (R-592 line 8). 
That amount represented the return for the labor of 
Mr. and Mrs. Takenaka and their daughter, all of whom 
worked in the Hotel (R-594 line 29, 595 and R-562 
line 15). It also represented the profit returned to them 
as a result of their enterprise. 
Both Roberts and Loll, witnesses for defendants, 
agreed that the operation of the Hotel by the Takenakas 
was fair or average (R-398 line 28, 489 line 1 and 50U 
line 17). 
The County's appraiser determined the income 
producing potential of the property on the basis of the 
gross rent received by the owners for 25 years (R-612-
617), which he determined to be fair and reasonable by 
comparative analysis (R-617 line 22 and 641 line 18). 
Defendants and their witnesses ignored the 25 
years of income experience to these owners and also 
the results of the actual operation of the Hotel over 
that time. What they did, over the repeated objections 
6 
01' plaintiff (R-282 line 30, 283, 373 line 7, 377 line 18 
and :~80 line 1) was present a hypothetical income and 
expense statement based on what they claimed the in-
come and expense should have been, not as critique of 
the Hotel's actual experience, but as a completely hypo-
thetical projection of an imaginary operation (Roberts 
H-376-38.J. and Loll ll-J.51-459). Essentially their testi-
mony was, that there were A rooms; the rent per room 
should haw been B; the occupancy rate should have been 
C; and the expenses should have been D; leaving an 
iinaginary profit of E, which when capitalized indicated 
the nilue of the Hotel to be X. They did not reduce the 
hypothetical income to account for the contribution 
thereto of personal property used in the Hotel ( R-524 
line 21), nor did they attribute to such income a profit 
for the enterprise of the operator. By their projected 
analysis the net income should have been $16,.i70 (R-
J59 line 7), after deducting wages of $7,500 (R-457 
li11e 1.5) ; whereas income received by the actual operator 
varied from $2,7.J.J. to $8,491 before deducting wages 
for Takenaka, his wife and his daughter (R-592 line 8). 
(In fairness it should be noted the Takenakas' oper-
ating statement showed as an expense the payment of 
rent to the owners, whereas the defendant's hypothetical 
statement, being a purported projection of the operat-
ing potential of the Hotel itself did not. Plaintiff con-
ternls that the fact that the Takenakas as operators, 
were able to earn only a subsistence income after pay-
ment of the rent to the owners indicated the rent was 
fair.) 
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Defendant's chief appraisal witness in his value <le. 
termination excluded the influence of what he described 
as institutional buying of the LDS Church in the area 
(R-449 line 26, 511line25, 517 line 24, and 522 li11e 27). 
Witnesses for both parties agreed that another 
available means of determining the value of the Hotel 
was by comparing it with the sales of similar hotels 
(R-671 line 26 and R-449 line ) . Unfortunately, there 
were a limited number of such comparable sales. There 
had, however, been a fairly recent sale of the hotel about 
which the witnesses for both sides testified at length 
(Loll R-478-480 and 528-531, Roberts R-351, Jensen 
R-367-639) and which was, probably, more than any 
hotel anywhere in the world, comparable physically, 
that is in terms of location, size, construction and clien-
tele. Testimony concerning that sale was rejected (R-
570 and R-672-676) because the sale was from a trustee 
to itself in another capacity, in spite of testimony that 
the beneficiaries were acting at arms length, and that the 
beneficiaries were acting at arms length, and that the 
price was determined by an appraisal (R-674 line 19). 
The Court further rejected the testimony of'"' ern-
er Kiepe concerning the value of the real property on 
which the Hotel was located, although the value of said 
real property was a separate element of the appraisals 
of each of the other appraisal witnesses (Loll R-461 
line 15 and Jensen R-614 line 28), upon the ground that 
Kiepe had not made an appraisal of the entire property 
(R-752 line 21). 
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The Court further rejected the testimony of Owen 
jlcEwan, a former Salt Lake City fireman, who con-
ducted fire drills in the Hotel within a month after it 
was rncate<l. His testimony would have been about the 
construction and physical condition of the Hotel in gen-
eral and about its condition as a fire hazard, which would 
have required extensive remodeling to comply with the 
Salt Lake City Building Fire Code, and would have 
rebutted testimony of defendant's witnesses on the same 
subject ( R-722 and 723). 
It is at least problematical, whether defendant's 
highly imaginative appraisal would have taken the jury 
from a realistic valuation of the Hotel property, but 
for, a deliberately posed highly prejudicial question or 
def en<lant' s counsel, asked of plaintiff's witness, Max 
Jenson, as to whether the county's valuation of the 
Colonial Hotel for tax purposes was not $130,000, ac-
companied by a flourish of a yellow card which def end-
ant' s counsel handed to the Clerk for marking (R-865, 
831, 868 and 87 4). Counsel of course knew that Judge 
Elton had ruled that such evidence was inadmissible at 
the previous trial. That counsel considered it important, 
is indicated by the fact that he alluded to it, again men-
tioning the figure of $130,000, in his closing remarks to 
the jury (R-785 line 6 and 792 line 18), even though the 
witness' answer was, "he didn't know." 
The defendant's spokesman, Harold Roberts, did 
a similar thing when he testified, entirely unresponsively, 
that the Church had made them a very substantial offer 
for their property, knowing that the Court had previous-
9 
ly ruled that such evidence was inadmissible ( H-~Oli 
line 30, 407). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOW-
ING DEFENDANTS TO INTRODUCE TESTI-
MONY AS TO THE VALUE OF THEIR 
PROPERTY BASED UPON THE CAPITALI-
ZATION OF INCOlHE: 
(A) THAT \i\T AS ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
PERSONAL PROPERTY USED IN THE 
OPERATION OF THE HOTEL BUSINESS. 
(B) THAT \VAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
THE OPERATION OF A BUSINESS AND 
NOT EXCLUSIVELY TO THE INCOME 
PRODUCING POTENTIAL OF THE REAL 
PROPERTY TAKEN. 
(C) THAT \VAS HYPOTHETICAL, CON-
JECTURAL, SPECULATIVE, AND FANCI-
FUL, IN THE EXTREME. 
The income producing potential of the Colonial 
Hotel to its owners was readily ascertainable. The Roh· 
erts family, the defendants in this case, had owned it 
and accepted as rent therefore, amounts ranging only 
from $500 to $700 per month over a period of nearly 
25 years. This in the face of many opportunities and 
admitted, but unsuccessful efforts on their part to 
raise the rent. But the Roberts family did not look 
IO 
lu that income to establish the value of the Hotel nor 
' 
did they look to the operating income that the Hotel 
:1dually produced, which, incidentally, indicates that 
after payment of the gross rent the Hotel produced 
only a bare subsistence for the operators, and thereby 
reinforces the economic fairness and correctness of the 
gross rent. They instead chose to speculate or project 
11hat they estimated the rents should have been, the 
occupancy rate should have been, the expenses should 
ha,·c been, the net profit should have been and thus, 
what the value should have been. The propriety of the 
Roberts family saying in this condemnation case, 
through Harold Roberts, speaking as an owner and as 
an expert, and by Max Loll, as a property appraiser, 
that the property should have produced an amount more 
than 3% times the amount accepted by the Roberts 
family for nearly 25 years is the question herein posed. 
The question is to what extent the Court should 
control or limit the opinion testimony of an expert wit-
ness to require it to conform to accepted standards, the 
determination of which requires the Court to act as a 
sort of super expert. 
Judge Elton took the position that once defend-
ant's witnesses qualified as experts by showing they had 
experience in the field over a period of time, they had 
apparently unlimited discretion in the selection of pro-
l'.esses whereby they reached their valuation opinions. 
Originally, Courts viewed the testimony of expert 
witnesses with a great deal of suspicion, see \Vigmore 
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on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Sec. 1917 and following. 
They haven't been exonerated yet, as Nichols on Eini-
nent Domain, 3rd Edition, points out at Section 18.t 
page 191. 
. "There ~1as been a_ wide SJ?read and growing 
distrust of expert witnesses m our trial courts. 
It has been characterized as 'inconclusive and 
often tainted.' In any case where expert opinion 
is admissible, the particular kind of an opinion 
desired by any party to the investigation can 
be readily procured by paying the market price 
therefore." * * * 
The problem is compounded where, as here, the 
opinion is based on capitalization of income. See Sack-
man' s Conclusion at page 6 of his speech and the ma· 
terial introductory thereto, wherein he points out that 
such data is used primarily where there is an absence of 
comparable sales or as a subordinate factor in the de-
termination of the value where there are such sales. 
(Plaintiff has attached to its brief a copy of a speech 
entitled, "Economical Approach to Valuation," giren 
by Julius L. Sackman, one of the authors of Nich· 
ols on Eminent Domain, while he was in Salt Lake 
City. The speech which is widely distributed, contains 
some 91 citations and is referred to in this brief in several 
places.) 
While it does impose upon the Court the role of 
super expert, it is a role they have traditionally played. 
As the Court in Sacramento and San Joaquin Draiwif/1' 
District v. Reed, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847 pointed out: 
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"The approach ignores the fact that the 'pro-
spective purchaser' is an abstraction, a ventrilo-
quist's dummy who speaks only with the voice of 
the flesh-and-blood valuation witness. In feeding 
words to the fictional buyer, the witness - be he 
appraiser or landowner - is confined only by 
his own imagination and by such narrower limits 
as the law may impose on him. A condemnation 
trial is a sober inquiry into values, designed to 
strike a just balance between the economic in-
terests of the public and those of the landowner. 
(See Krntovil and Harison, Eminent Domain 
- Policy and Concept, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 596, 626.) 
There is a limit to imaginative claims even when 
described in terms of a prospective buyer's mental 
reactions. To say that only the witness' valuation 
opinion has probative value, that his 'reasons' 
have none, ignores reality. His reasons may in-
fluence the verdict more than his figures. To say 
that all obections to his reasons go to weight, not 
admissibility, is to minimize judicial responsibility 
for limiting the permissible arena in condemna-
tion trials. The responsibility for defining the 
extent of compensable rights is that of the 
courts." (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff contends that the Court has a duty to 
supervise the methodolOf,"Y of expert witnesses and that 
such duty required it to reject portions of the testimony 
of the defendant's witnesses, Loll and Roberts initially, 
and having failed that, to qualify it or caution or in-
struct the jury regarding it after it was in. 
13 
!NCO.ME ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The amount of income that <lefeudant's witnesses 
capitalized included all of the rent they estimated was 
obtainable from the rental of the rooms. There were in 
said rooms numerous items of personal property which 
were not taken by the condemnors i.e., bed, dressen. 
chairs, linens, towels and other personal property (R-
523 line 23) . 
Clearly a part of said rents were to be paid by the ten-
ants for the use of personal property and part for the 
use of the real property, of which only the real property· 
was taken by the condemnor. 
The proposition that an opinion as to value Lased 
upon income contributed to in part by the utilization of 
personal property which is not being taken, is erroneous, 
is perhaps too obvious to require to citation. See, how-
ever, Sackman's comment at page 10 of his speech, al 
follows: 
"Obviously the rents paid by the roomers, were 
based among other things, upon the use of the 
furnishings as well as the rooms and, thus, were 
not a proper basis for valuation of the real pro-
perty. This was a business." 
See also 29 CJS 2d 1201: 
"Evidence of rental income for furnished 
apartments is inadmissible since such reflects the 
market value of the real estate plus personal 
property which is not taken." 
14 
In the first trial plaintiff unsuccessfully objected 
to defendant's projection of a hypothetical operating 
)latement, by each of the 3 witnesses by which it was 
introduced, because it was conjectural, it included in-
come receiYed from personal property and it included 
a profit from a business operation. In the second trial 
plaintiff objected to the operating statement of Gus 
Johns. The Court overruled that objection upon de-
fense counsel's observation that it was the same proce-
dure previously admitted (R-283 line 5). The Court 
on>rruled a similar objection made at the outset of the 
operating statement testimony of Harold Roberts (R-
373-37.J<). The Court thereafter agreed that the record 
would show plaintiff's continuing objection to such 
tebtimony ( R-380 line 4). 
Defendants principal appraisal witness, Loll, ad-
mitted on cross-examination that the projected income 
from which he made his value determination included 
the contribution of the personal property and that if 
that was error his opinion was oYerstated (R-524 line 
28). Plaintiff moYed the court to strike the testimony 
of Loll on that ground which the Court refused (R-571 
line 20). Plaintiff then asked the Court to instruct the 
jmy that they should not consider the value of the furni-
ture and furnishings contained in the Hotel nor the 
contribution to income of said furniture and furnishings 
in determining the value of the Hotel on an income 
basis, (plaintiff's requested instruction No. 14 R-182) 
whid1 the Court refused. The Court did not otherwise 
enlighten the jurors on the subject. 
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INCOME ATTRIBUTABLE TO PROFITS 
AND/OR THE PERSONAL EFFORTS 
OF THE OPERATORS 
Defendants in projection of an imaginary and, of 
course, optimistic, hotel operation attributed all of the 
income derived from said operation to the property it-
self and none to the business enterprise of the operator. 
Worse yet, they inferred and argued that the iuco1m 
received by the actual operators was attributable to the 
property, without diminution even for the salaries and 
wages of the operators. See page 556 of the record 
wherein defendant's counsel had defendant's witness 
I 
Loll add to the gross rent of the owner, the wages of ' 
the Takenakas and describe the result as the net operat-
ing income of the Takenakas. Defendant's counsel later 
asked plaintiff's witness, .Max Jenson, over plaintiff's 
objection, whether if you added Takenaka's operating 
income to the owner's income and capitalized the result 
by a cap rate of 16.5, it wouldn't indicate a value of 
$100,700. Whereupon, Jenson agreed that the arith-
metic seemed about right ( R-866, 835-36, 871 and 
879). Defendant's counsel thereafter alluded in ar· 
gument to plaintiff's appraisal, as treating only 
part of the income (R-779 line 28, 781 line 25, 
and 784 line 17) . He reserved for his final remark, 
the direct argument that it was necessary to find the 
value of the property to add the two incomes together 
observing "that wasn't his testimony, it was just com-
mon sense" ( R-800 line 8) . 
The authorities uniformly hold that the admission 
16 
111 testimony a'; to niluc based upon income from the 
11pera ti on of a business, particularly one which includes 
the rendering of personal services, is error. Sackman 
points out at the bottom of page 8 of his speech: 
"It is, aeeordi11gly, \Yell settled that evidence 
of sueh iueome is not admissable as proof of the 
value of property. The profits of a business are 
too uneertai11 and dependent on too many con-
tingeneies to be safely accepted as any evidence 
of the ndue of the property on which the business 
is conducted." 
And at the middle of Page 9: 
''It follows that capitalization based upon such 
incompetent evidence is not only not a criterion 
of value, hut is ina<lmissable in evidence and may 
uot be considered as a factor in the ultimate con-
sideration." 
See particularly Page 13 where he notes: 
"Nevertheless, the fundamental concept that 
ineome from business is not admissable as proof 
of value of property still retains its general 
validity. This is best typified by the valuation 
of motels and hotels. Here the cases undeviating-
l.11 hold that there is no leyal ju~tification for the 
capitali:::rdion of income from the use of personal 
properf.IJ and income from the rendering of per-
so 1w l se n 1ice." (Emphasis added) 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, Section 
lH.a, at Page 3.J.O of Yol. .5, states the rule as follows: 
" ( 1) Commercial Property. 
"If the owner of property uses it himself for 
commerc;al purposes, the amount of his profits 
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from the business conducted upon the proper\\ 
depends so much upon the capital employed auJ 
the fortune, skill and good management witli 
which the business is conducted, that it furnishe.1 
no test to the value of the property. It is, accord. 
ingly, well settled that evidence of the profits of 
a business conducted upon land taken for public 
use is not admissable in proceedings for the de-
termination of the compensation which the owner 
of the land shall receive. Profits ~f a business 
are too uncertain, and depend on too many con-
tingencies safely to be accepted as any evidence 
of the useable value of the property upon whicn 
the business is carried on. Prof its depend upon 
the times, the amount of capital invested, the . 
social, religious and financial position in the com- 1 
munity of the one carrying it on, and other ele-
ments which might be suggested. \Vhat one man 
might do at a profit, another might only do at 
a loss." 
American Jurisprudence states the rule at 27 Am. 
J ur.2d 338, Eminent Domain, Section 431, entitled 
"Income or Profits," as follows: 
"In the absence of a constitutional provision 
or statute requiring a different rule, it is g~ner~l- , 
ly held that evidence of past or prospective in· 
come or profits from a business conducted on 
property is too speculative, uncertain and remote 
to be considered as a basis for computing or as· 
certaining the market value of the property in 
condemnation proceedings." 
That defendants in this case attempted to confuse 
the wages of the operators with the income produced 
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uy the Hotel property only emphasizes the need for and 
the correctness of the foregoing rule. 
Plaintiff in addition to its objection to defend-
ant's operating statement testimony, above noted, asked 
the Court to instruct the jury not to consider the nor-
mal profit of the operator in determining the hotel's 
income producing potential, which request the Court 
refused. (Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 19, R-
187) 
INCOME \VAS CONJECTURAL 
Plaintiff contends the appropriate measure of the 
Hotel's income producing potential is the rents received 
uy the owner, provided it was, as here, a reasonable or 
fair market rent. Even though plaintiff contends it 
would be inappropriate, plaintiff would not complain 
in this case, if defendants used the actual operating 
income of the hotel (since the actual operating income 
constituted only subsistence wages for the operator, it 
tends to prove that the owner's rental was at least fair 
or more than fair to the owner) . But plaintiff strongly 
protests the projection by defendant of a purely imagi-
nary operation resulting in an operating income some 
three and a half times that income voluntarily received 
aud accepted by the owners, the Roberts family, for 
nearly 25 years. (Actual net income to the owners was 
approximately $4,984.00 R-392 line 1 and 394 line 
U). The projected operating income which the defend-
ants capitalized to find the value of the property was 
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$16,523 in the case of Harold Roberts ( R-381 line 1
1 
and $16,470 in the case of l\Iax Loll ( R-45!J line i 
1 
As Sackman points out, the use of the econornil 
approach to valuation has been regarded by the court1 
with suspicion and, accordingly, has been allowerl j11 
many jurisdictions only when more cmwentional ap-
proaches were tmavailable. (See the summary of Sack-
man' s conclusions on this point at Page() of his spcedi. 1 
A corollary requirement, apparently everywhere ob-
served, is that when used it must not be done on a hasi1 
of conjecture. See the statement at 27 Am. J ur. 2d Hi 
and 88, Eminent Domain, Sec. 286 - "Income or re11-
tals; capitalization," as follows: 
, 
"However, the capitalization of income methu<l 1 
should be carefully scrutinized even where appro-
priate. 'Vhile it may be the only useable method 
under the circumstances, its use must be based 
on a foundation which minimizes conjecture and 
uncertainty." 
Or Sackman, at Page 17: 
""There, however, the process invokes the 
capitalization of a hypothetical income from a 
hypothetical structure and the entire proces~ i1 
simply a figment of the appraiser's imagination. 
the result has been uniformly rejected as con· 
jectural in the extreme." 
The cases giving rise to the foregoing observations 
are generally those in which the landowner seeks to 
show a proposed improvement and then seeks to capi· 
talize the hypothetical income therefrom. Apparenth 
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few or no landowners have had the temerity or audacity 
to completely ignore the actual business operation; to 
hypothesize a highly imaginative and optimistic income 
and then to capitalize the imaginary result. Even 
assuming defendants were entitled to capitalize a busi-
ness profit as opposed to rental of a building and im-
provements and added to that, they were entitled to 
include in said income, return from the utilization of 
personal property, plaintiff's contend that they were 
obligated to utilize the actual income from the opera-
tion. They do not contend they would have been bound 
by the actual income, they could have adjusted it to 
correct for an inferior or superior operation, but they 
11ere bound to begin with reality, something that existed 
in the marketplace. Otherwise, the whole foundation 
of their testimony must be rejected as purely speculative 
and with it the conclusions supported thereby. At first 
blush, it may appear not to matter whether one starts 
with the actual operation and makes adjustments that 
involve speculation, or whether one just starts with 
~peculation. But see the difference in the instant case. 
Both Harold Roberts and Max Loll testified that the 
Takenakas, who were the operators of the hotel, were 
fair or good or average operators (R-398 line 28, 498 
line I and 509 line 17) . At the same time, the only 
possible explanation for the fact that their actual opera-
tion returned less profit than the imaginary one pro-
posed by defendants, is that their operation was some-
how inadequate or that defendants' imagination is de-
fective. 
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Two cases involving capitalization of projeded 
profits and loss of profits are State v. Smith, 377 P2it 
352, and State v. Bare, 377 P2d 357; both are .Montana 
cases decided in 1962. l n both, the decisions of the trial 
court were reversed because they allowed appraisal wit-
nesses to capitalize, either income or loss of income, that 
was determine by computation, by the appraiser, ut 
anticipated costs and expenses. The court, in the second 
case, said at Page 363 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"Further, in this case, none of the figures, 
being based on one year only, and in part pure 
estimates, have such degree of certainty to be a 
credible factor .... \Vhile we do not reject tht 1 
method in all cases, \Ve believe for future guid-
ance in eminent domain cases, the capitalization 
of income should be carefully scrutinized erni 1 
where it may be appropriate as one of the tools 
of the judicial workshop. . . . However, its use 
must be based on a foundation which minimizes 
to the extent possible, conjecture and uncer-
tainty." 
Again, plaintiff, in addition to objecting to the 
testimony as it came in, asked the court for a clarifying 
instruction which was refused. (Plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 15, R-183) 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF 'VAS DEPRIVED 01" .\ 
FAIR TRIAL BY DEFENDANTS' coUX· 
SEL'S INTENTION AL l\IENTION OF A TAX 
VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY IN THE 
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SUM OF $130,000 AND BY DEFENDANT 
HAROLD ROBERTS' MENTION OF AN OF-
FER TO PURCHASE SAID PROPERTY 
' BOTH BEING MATTERS \VHICH HAD PRE-
\'IOUSL Y llEEN RULED INADMISSIBLE 
BY THE COURT. 
This writer believes that defendants could not have 
sol<l their inherently deficient appraisal of the hotel to 
the jury, but for the combination of that appraisal as 
justification for the correction of what the jurors were 
le<l to believe was a tax inequity. The jurors I talked 
to indicated that some of the jury held out for a time 
for a verdict of $130,000 based on the taxes alone. The 
situation fairly sings with poetic justice. Plaintiff is 
the County. As the County, they were the tax collector, 
and in the minds of the jury, who announced prior to 
their selection that they were taxpayers, they were also 
the tax assessor, whereas in fact, in this case of down-
town commercial property, the State Tax Commission 
was the tax assessor. The impact of the proposition 
that the County ought to have to pay for property the 
amount they claimed it was worth for tax purposes is 
obvious. The consequence is that if the circumstances 
of the tax valuation being before the jury is error it is 
highly prejudicial error. 
Let us look at the fairness of it. First, defendants 
suggested to the jury that the County had made the 
appraisal and not the State, which is untrue. Second, 
it was done in a way and at a time that plaintiff was 
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defenseless. In the first trial defendant, Harold Uob 
erts blurted out, unresponsively, that the property wa, 
valued by the County for tax purposes at $Iao,ooo 
Plaintiff could and did then cross-examine on the sub. 
ject. It could have also brought the tax appraiser in a1 
a witness to determine-first, if the statement was true: 
and second, the deficiency of the tax appraisal as u 
determinant of market value. llut in this trial the testi-
mony was from plaintiffs counsel after the court had, 
in the first trial, declared such evidence inadmissible· 
I 
thoroughly instructed that jury to ignore it, and then 
declared a mistrial partly as a result of it. Plaintiff 
could do nothing but hope the jury hadn't heard, a hopt 
rendered vain by counsel's again mentioning the figure 
in his closing argument, in the total absence of evidence 1 
in the record. Plaintiff couldn't even point out tha! 
the testimony came from counsel and was not evide11te. 
for fear of unduly emphasizing the point. 
The court is familiar with the fact that the mere 
mention of insurance by a plaintiff in the course of a 
tort trial, as a matter of common practice, results in 
the immediate declaration of a mistrial or the later, 
granting of a new trial, or a reversal on appeal. See thr 
annotation at 4 ALR2d 761. Courts have similarly 
treated references to the wealth or poverty of the liti·' 
gants, 32 ALR2d 9, and to arguments or references to 
the fact that another defendant has been convicted or 
pleaded guilty. See annotation 48 ALR2d 1031. 
Plaintiff urges that the error here complained f11 
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was, at least, as or more prejudicial than a mention of 
liability insurance and under the circumstances its er-
roneous character was even better known to the perpe-
trator. Defendants should not be allowed to profit from 
their flagrant and intentional commission of error in the 
face of the court's rulings. 
Plaintiff contends that even if the Supreme Court 
should now find that evidence of the tax valuation is 
admissible, it should still find it admissible in this case, 
because of Judge Elton's ruling in the first trial and 
the consequence that, because of that ruling, plaintiff 
could not, for fear among other things of being found 
in contempt, meet it. Nonetheless, precedent strongly 
indicates that such evidence is inadmissible. See Nichols 
un Erninent Dornain, 3rd Edition, Section 22.1 at page 
~99 of Volume 5: 
"It is almost everywhere the law that the value 
placed upon a parcel of land for the purpose of 
taxation bv the assessors of the town in which it 
is situated. is no evidence of its value for other 
than tax purposes. This rule of exclusion has 
heen applied in the determination of value in 
eminent domain proceedings." 
There is an annotation entitled "Evidence - Tax 
Valuation" at 39 ALR 2d 209. The general rule is 
there stated at page 214 as follows: 
"It is the overwhelming weight of authority 
that assessd value is not competent direct evi-
dence of value for purposes other than taxation. 
Thus it has been held or stated in a large number 
' 
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of cases that evidence of assessed value, or other 
valuation for tax purposes, at least of itself ai 
determined without the participation of 'tlit 
owner of the property, is not evidence of !ht 
value of the property for other purposes." 
In Littlcdikc v. IV ood, '255 P 17'2, our Utah Su· 
preme Court reversed the trial court and ordered a 
new trial, citing as error the admission of the Couuty 
Treasurer's testimony as to the value of <lefendanb 
lands without any foundation that the Treasurer had 
any knowledge of such value except as shown by the 
assessment rolls. The Court noted with approval the 
reason given in the case of Hanover JV ater Co. v. Ash-
land Iron Co., 84 Pa. 279, that 
"An assessment is merely an ex parte statement 
made by an officer not subject to cross-examina· 
tion and is no evidence of the value of the land 
assessed." 
To that should be added the comment that such 
assessments are notoriously wrong, a matter about which 
the Court can take judicial notice. 
The defendant, Harold Roberts, did a similar 
thing when he answered, unresponsively, a question on 
cross-examination as to whether the acquistions by 
Zions Securities didn't have anything to do with the 
County's acquisition, by saying: "but it related to the 
same problem. They were buying property all around 
us and made definitely an off er, substantial offer, for 
this property in or about that same time." ( R-406 line 
27 and following) 
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At first blush, his answer may appear innocent. 
When you consider that plaintiff obtained a ruling from 
the Court in the first trial that there should be no men-
tion of such off er because of Judge Elton's determina-
tion that said offer was uncertain, to which ruling, 
Defendant Harold Roberts had expressed his pique, it 
is clear that his answer constituted a deliberate, inten-
tional fouling of the record. Judge Elton's comment in 
refusing to strike that comment upon the ground that 
plaintiff had allowed the witness to explain his answer 
is just not well taken, the question could have been 
answered "yes" or "no." 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
REJECT OR INSTRUCT THE JURY CON-
CERNING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFEND-
ANT'S 'VITNESS, LOLL, WHO ARTIFICIAL-
LY EXCLUDED FROM HIS VALUE DETER-
MINATION THE EFFECT ON THE MARKET 
VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, OF 
NUMEROUS PURCHASES OF THE L.D.S. 
CHURCH. 
Defendant's witness, Loll, in his direct testimony, 
testified at length about purchases of property by the 
L.D.S. Church in the area of the subject property and 
about the effect of such so-called "institutional buy-
ing". ( R-436 to 439) He then testified that he excluded 
this influence in his examination of the market (R-466, 
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line 10, 449 line 26, 511 line 25, 517, line 24, & 52! 
line 27). He testified that the influence on the marktl 
was substantial (H-518 line 18) and that its effect 11·a). 
to depress the market ( R-523 line 3) . 
Plaintiff moved the court to reject Loll' s testimon1 
upon the ground that he had excluded the effect of th~ 
Church's acquisition, although it was one of the infiu· 
ences in the real market at the time (R-571 line :201, 
which motion was denied. Plaintiff then requested a11 
instruction that would have advised the jury that they 
should consider all of the factors in the market at tl11 
time of the taking, which request was refused. (Plai11- J 
tiff's Requested Instruction No. 18-R-186). 
There is no evidence and it is not a fact, that the 1 
Church's purchases were related to the condemnation 
of the property for the Civic Auditorium. It is true 
that the Church later leased the property owned b1, 
them, within the designated site, to the county; but then 
is no indication that they were buying for that purpose. 
The proposition that defendants were entitled tr 
receive as compensation the market value of their prop· 
erty is too clear to require citation, but that means 
the market as it is and not as it would be without ad· 
verse influences. Defendants were not entitled to en· 
hance the market value about which they testified b) 
deleting such adverse influence. 
The writer has not found a case wherein the exclu· 
sion of the effect of institutional buying was criticizer! 
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and accordingly, cannot assist the Court with specific 
precedent. The discussion in Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, 3rd Edition, Section 18.42 ( 1) beginning at 
\'olume 5, page :HO, is in point, particularly, the ma-
terial in the supplement thereto. 
Such evidence should have been stricken. See 
Ccntrnl Illinois Light Cornpany v. Nierstheimer, 185 
N. E. 2d 841, wherein the Court said: 
"It is settled that where opinions of witnesses 
in condemnation cases are based in part upon 
elements of damage which cannot legally be 
taken into consideration as well as upon elements 
which would properly be taken into consideration, 
these opinions do not form a proper basis for a 
wrdict. (Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. 
Cooper, 322 Ill. 11, 18, 152 N.E. 491) There-
fore, if it appears that the opinions of the de-
fendants' witnesses as to the value of the land 
not taken were based upon improper elements 
of damage, their opinions as to such a value 
should not have been considered by the Trial 
Court." 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
'fESTil\IONY OF DEFENDANTS' 'VITNESS, 
LOLL, AND IN REJECTING TESTIMONY 
OF PLAINTIFF'S \VITNESS, JENSON, RE 
THE COl\IP ARABLE SALE OF THE UPLAND 
HOTEL. 
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There was an abundance of testimony about tht 
Upland Hotel. Defendants first introduced testirn
0111 
. 
concerning the income received by it, its rent schedule·, 
and occupancy rates, and a comparison of it physicalh 
with the Roberts' property. Plaintiff introduced a pit-
ture of it; compared it physically with the Rober\\ 
property; introduced testimony showing the rents ff 
served to the owner; and introduced the testimo!ly r1! 
its manager to show what its rents, occupancy rate; 
and income actually were. There was even testimony 
to the effect that the manager lived in the hotel as <l1a 
the manager of the Roberts' property. Its location wa1 
very near the Roberts' property; its clientele was similar) 
its size and accommodations were comparable. Plain 
tiff offered testimony concerning the sale of the prop I 
erty in 1961 for two ( 2) purposes : ( 1 ) As a direr: 
comparable, and ( 2) to prove the relationship of it· 
sales price to its gross rentals and, thereby, to establisf1. 
the value of the Roberts' property to determine a gr01· 
income multiplier to apply to the income on the Robert1 
property, the process by which plaintff's witness mad1 
his principal determination of value. 
The Court first rejected the sale ( R-570 line 28 
when defendants' witness, Loll, on redirect examinatioi: 
testified that in his opinion it was not at arms lengtl: 
transaction, because it was a sale from Tracy Collu1· 
Trust Co. as trustee for the Fisher 'V arehouse Corn 
pany to Tracy Collins Trust Co. as trustee for fm 11 
children of M.rs. Covey, and because the seller needel 
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!llOney ( R-588). The Court again rejected the sale, 
although, plaintiff's witness, Jenson, said that he had 
considered the sale in his appraisal, that the price was 
an attempt to find the market and that it was determined 
by an appraisal ( R-67 4). 
Our Utah Supreme Court has given serious atten-
tion to the admissability of comparable sales in two 
cases, State v. Peek, 1953, 1 Ut.2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 and 
State v. Peterson, 1961, 12 Ut.2d 317, 366 P.2d 76. 
In the Peek case, the Court stated the rule as fol-
lows: 
"Thus, the price paid for similar lands, if the 
time of such sale and location of the lands are 
sufficiently near and the sale is made without 
compulsion, is admissable in evidence on direct 
examination to show the value of the lands in 
question." (Emphasis added) 
In the Peterson case, the Court stated the rule as 
follows: 
"Nevertheless, in order for evidence of other 
sales to be admissable, it should appear that the 
lands are generally similar, particularly, as to 
factors having a bearing on values: that they 
are in the same locality; are similarly situated; 
have the same or similar, actual or potential uses; 
are of about the same fertility, if that factor is 
pertinent· that the other sale was voluntary on 




Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, does nr.1 • 
state the rule comprehensively, but treats it by sub-topit,: 
at Section 21.31 and 21.32. Those subtopics are: 
Degree of Similarity 
Proximity in Place 
Proximity in Time 
Comparison 
and Forced Sales 
The significance of the Utah and Nichols detit1i 
tions is that the only qualification made by them in any 
way related to whether the sale is by a trustee to tht ! 
same trustee for different beneficiaries is whether !Le' 
sale is voluntary or whether it is a forced sale. Corn : 
parable sales, to be admissable, need not contain all. 
of the elements of the standard definition of market I 
value, such as exposure for a reasonable time in tht 
market, as suggested by defendants at the trial. The 
important thing is that they relate to what an informea. 
buyer was willing to pay an informed seller for similar 
property. Since both buyer and seller had the benefit 
of an appraisal, it is fair to say that they were highly 
informed. 
Forced sales are defined by Nichols at Section 
21.32 of the above cited treatise as follows: 
":Forces sales usually involve transactions in 
which there is an element of compulsion either 
on the part of the seller, who is obligated to ~cl 
with undue haste, thereby affording him an Ul 
adequate period in which to effect a reasoua~le 
deal, or on the part of the purchaser, who !t11 
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purely personal reasons or necessities, is com-
pelled to pay a higher price than an ordinary 
purchaser ~ould be willing to pay. However, it 
has been said that there is a presumption, in the 
technical and proper meaning of that word, that 
the price of land sold was fixed freely and not 
under compulsion. In the absence of evidence 
warrantying finding that a sale was made under 
such compulsion as to make a price inadmissable 
as evidence of value, consideration may be given 
as to the sale. It has been said 'involuntary' sales 
imply compulsion under a decree, execution or 
something more than inability to maintain the 
property. The element of compulsion must be 
based on legal, not economic, factors. For the 
purpose of determining admissability of compara-
tive sales, compulsion is not shown to exist where 
a person is compelled by force of circumstances 
to part with property which he might desire to 
hold." 
It is clear that the trustee in the Upland sale was 
neither compelled to buy or sell in any legal or practical 
~ense. The testimony of Jenson that the sale was made 
on the basis of an appraisal and the experience of the 
Court concerning the obligation of trustees to obtain 
fair prices, of which it could take judicial notice, should 
dispose of the question of compulsion. 
Another possible basis of the Court's ruling, although 
not identified, despite counsel for plaintiff advising the 
court of the urgency of the question and requesting 
the basis of its ruling in order to overcome the objec-
tion, is the matter of time. The sale of the Upland Hotel 
11 as in 1961 and the time of the taking was April, 1966. 
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With respect to that matter, the following items should 
be noted: · 
(a) The absence of other comparable sales. 
( b) The testimony that the market yaJue, 
were declining (since plaintiff the party request. 
ing the admission of the old sale, defendants can 
only complain if prices are rising). 
( c) At the time plaintiff sought to introduce 
this evidence, defendants had been allowed to in 
traduce comparable sales going hack further intu 
1959 and 1960 upon the ground that later corn 
parables were scarce because of the so-called insti 
tutional buying and auditorium project itself. (R· 
467 line 6 & 468 line 9) . 
( d) :M.ost importantly, because the announced 
principal purpose for the introduction of the Up· 
land sale was to establish a gross income multi· 
plier, a matter that does not change with time 
\Vhile the value of the property may change the 
relationship of the value to the income it will pru· 
duce does not, or at least that is the hypothesi1 
of the income approach to valuation. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTIM1 
THE PROPOSED TESTil\IONY OF 'VERNER 
KIEPE ON HIS OPINION OF THE YALl1E 
OF THE ROBERTS LAND AND IN REJECT 
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IN(; THE PROPOSED TESTIMONY OF 
; OWEN l\icElV AN ON HIS OBSERVATIONS 
OF THE HOTEL BUILDING IN APRIL, 1966. 
Plaintiff's witness, 'Verner Kiepe, acknowledged 
that he did not appraise the hotel property but testi-
fied that he had reviewed all of the appraisals on the 
auditorium site including the appraisals of the hotel. 
He further would have testified that he had an inde-
pendent opinion concerning the value of the real prop-
erty upon which the hotel was located, but for an objec-
tion made to that offer, which the court sustained (R-
751 line 24). 
Counsel for defendants in arguing for the rejection 
of Kiepe's testin1ony on the value of the land said 
that uumerous cases held that it was inlproper for an 
expert witness to testify as to the value of the land 
alone. After some search, plaintiff has failed to find 
such cases. Plaintiff agrees that the value that must 
be found is the value of the land with the buildings 
· thereon and, further, that it is inlproper to give evidence 
· as to each value separately and simply add them to-
, gether. 
l\That plaintiff contends is that the value of the 
land separately was an item considered by each of the 
witnesses to value; that plaintiff was entitled to in-
' troduce the additional testimony of Kiepe to rebut 
I the evidence given by Loll and to support that given 
~ 11y .f enson; and that he was further entitled to introduce 
·. that value as one of the items to be considered by the 
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Jury in their overall consideration as to value. Thr 
only thing plaintiff was not entitled to do was to iutru 
duce evidence on the value of the land separately fruii: 
that of the building and then simply add the two to. 
gether contrary to the so-called unit rule. 
In Cleveland Terminal and Valley Railroad Com 
pany v. Gorush, 81 N.E. 1186, 1907 (Ohio), the Cour 
reversed a Trial Court for refusing testimony as to t]
1
, 
separate value of the land, where the land contamtti 
buildings. The Court in the later case of Dernn i 
Cincinnati, 162 Fed 633, 1908, commented on the G0 
rush case, saying: 
"But on consideration, it is evident that tl1r 
value of the land enters into the value of tn1 
parcel in a way the value of a building does not 
If you are an expert, you may testify as to tnr 
value of the land exclusively of the building· 
but you cannot properly separate the building· 
from the land and testify to its value wholl) 
irrespective of the land." 
The Court in discussing with counsel, plaintiff'· 
offer of the testimony of Owen McEwan, indicated tha: 
it felt that inasmuch as the conditions observed 01 
McEwan did not enter into or alter the opinion of \ni 
appraisal witnesses concerning the value of the RoberL 
property, such testimony was superfluous and woul11 
be excluded on that ground. Plaintiff contends that ir 
was entitled to rebut the testimony of defendants regarn 
ing the condition of the hotel and that it is entitled I 
presents its own testimony concerning the physici 
36 
condition of the landowners property. In support there-
of see 27 Am. J ur. 2d, Page 324, Eminent Domain, Sec. 
m-Generally; Evidence as to Value: 
"As bearing upon the value of a parcel of land 
taken by eminent domain, it is competent for 
either party to offer evidence descriptive of the 
property and its location, physical characteristics, 
advantages, purposes, and surroundings. It is 
ordinarily contemplated that both parties to the 
controversy may submit all facts deemed by 
either, pertinent to the issue, and objections going 
to pertinency and relevancy should be sustained 
only in extreme and plain cases." 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons plaintiff respectfully 
submits that it should be granted a new trial and re-
quests that this Court determine that the Trial Court 
should haYe rejected defendants' determination of mar-
ket Yalue that arbitrarily excluded existing detrimental 
influences of the market; that was based upon income 
that was conjectural; that included return ·from 
personal property not taken; and included return for 
the personal services and profits of the operator of 
the hotel. 
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